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INTRODUCTION
What is sex? Is it an accidental or contingent property that every person can
be said to have? I am brunette and female, but the Pope is bald and male. Or,
is sex more constitutive, that is, an essential part of who we are? In this re-
spect, the claim is often made that women experience the world ditfierently
than men. Or, is sex something we do?
If we consider sex as an adjective, can we or should we be able to manipu-
late it like a new hair style? Or does the notion of sexual malleability trivialize
the significance of sex when considered as a noun? Lastly, is sex a verb that
acts on us, constitutes us, harms or taints us?2
The answer to all these questions must be yes.
Feminist theory reveals that a seemingly simple question about the defini-
tion of sex demands a sophisticated answer, one informed by a critical investi-
gation of power relations, discursive practices, and epistemological
standpoints. In attempting to describe both what a woman is and how we can
come to know her, feminists have struggled to determine just where descrip-
tion stops and inscription begins. Given the complexity of these inquiries, it is
hardly surprising that the many people who consider themselves feminists
cannot reach consensus on these or on other complex matters such as equality
1. MADONNA, SEx (1992). The book is unpaginated. References to it will be to page
numbers, with page numbering starting at the first page following the cover.
* J.D., 1986, Northeastern University; LL.M., 1993, Yale University; J.S.D. candidate,
Yale University.
2. "If to preserve this vessel for my lord From any other foul unlawful touch Be not to be a
strumpet, I am none." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 4, sc. 2, lines 81-83 (New Cam-
bridge 1942).
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and sexual liberty. We have fought viciously among ourselves over such issues
as whether to favor a paradigm of equal or different treatment,3 the role of
pornography in women's oppression, 4 and whether Roe v. Wade' was cor-
rectly decided.6
Why does such vituperative disagreement exist among supposed sisters in
the struggle to dismantle the vestiges of patriarchy? I believe the answer lies
not in deconstructing patriarchy, an enterprise that has consumed the hearts
and minds of so many feminists, but in responding to the rarely asked question
about the nature and meaning of sex. The question demands serious consider-
ation of metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic arguments with respect
to whom it is we are liberating, how we may know her, and how we can speak
about her truthfully. Feminist theory, particularly feminist legal theory, often
finds false currency in over-attention to the power of men in women's lives
while neglecting the need for ostensive theory: to whom and with what kind
of digit are we pointing when we say "set her free"? Such an impoverished
notion of both the subject and object of feminist discourse has, not surpris-
ingly, left feminist theorists at loggerheads when imprecise theory meets real
life: does equality demand similar or different treatment from men? are abor-
tion rights a matter of privacy or autonomy? will sex ultimately destroy us or
set us free? And so the fight is engaged.
Given the profound and fundamental differences in our understanding of
the feminist project, it does not seem possible to think of ourselves as part of a
coherent movement. Indeed, our inclination to cling to the myth of feminist
identity politics could be seen as dispositive proof of our failure to understand
the complexity and comprehensiveness of the regime that we are at once op-
pressed by and reify.7 Is it possible that the utility, or worse, the concept of
3. See, e.g., Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 513 (1983) (advancing an equal treatment model); Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist
Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 444 (1981) ("[G]enuine sexual justice cannot be achieved un-
less decisionmakers comprehend that the degraded status of woman is and always has been a
function of the reproductive division of labor."); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/
Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race The-
ory, 2 DUKE L.J. 296 (1991) (proposing a post-modem alternative to the equal/different treat-
ment dichotomy); Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts
and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 175 (1982) (arguing for a different treatment
paradigm).
4. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censor-
ship Taskforce, Et Al., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985)
(No. 84-3147), affid, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), reprinted in 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 69 (1987-1988);
ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1989).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Rhonda Copelon, Losing the Negative Right to Privacy: Building Sexual and
Reproductive Freedom, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 15 (1990-91); Ruth B. Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375
(1985).
7. Judith Butler could be interpreted as expressing this view in a recent essay. See Judith
Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THE-
ORIES 13, 14 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991) ("I'm permanently troubled by identity categories, consider
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identity politics has come to an end? Much is at stake when we undertake to
answer the question, what is sex?
Then comes Madonna, quite literally. With Sex8 she provides us with her
answer to the question, What is sex? In this work, Madonna goes public with
her sexuality, her fantasies, her description of and prescription for pleasure.9
Through the depiction of her sexuality in photographs and text, she observes:
"A lot of people are afraid to say what they want. That's why they don't get
what they want." 10
It is unclear what Madonna intends us to make of this work she calls
Sex." What can we make of it? Is it a book? Is it an event? Is it a perform-
ance? Can these really be her fantasies? If they are, what do they mean? Are
they supposed to turn us on? What if they do? What if they don't? By claim-
ing that she is depicting her own fantasies, 12 does she radically assert herself as
sexual subject or does she engage in harmful auto-subordination by reproduc-
ing her own oppression as sexual object? Is Sex anything more than Ma-
donna's best effort yet to make fistfuls of money from pop culture's fascination
with her narcissism? Finally, who cares?
Even the way the book is packaged holds potential sexual meaning. It
comes wrapped in a silver mylar bag (no shrink wrap for Madonna). On the
front of the bag is an image of Madonna's orgasmic face, closed eyes adorned
lusciously with dark false eyelashes, moist lips slightly parted, and mouth
open just wide enough to see her tongue planted suggestively on the roof of
her mouth. "MADONNA SEX" runs across her left cheekbone. The photo-
graph on the back of the wrapper is less easily identifiable, but with a little
effort, one can make out Madonna's breasts cupped in her own hands, hard
nipples held between her fingers. Next to her left hand, on the side of her
them to be invariable stumbling-blocks, and understand them, even promote them, as sites of
necessary trouble.").
8. MADONNA, supra note 1.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id at 121.
11. Whatever Madonna's intentions, the work represents the most recent example of an
ongoing effort among popular performers to contest conventional sex, gender, and sexual
scripts. See, ag., MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSS-DRESSING & CULTURAL
ANxIErY 357 (1992) ("Liberace, pianist, singer, tap dancer, and fashion plate, clearly regarded
himself as a direct influence upon the pop stars of the eighties, citing Prince, Michael Jackson,
Boy George, and Madonna as among those who had learned from him about 'escapism and
fantasy.'") (quoting LIBERACE, THE VONDERFUL PRIVATE WORLD OF LIBERACE 171
(1987)); id (" 'There was a time,' he reminisced, 'when one woman might say to another "May
I borrow your lipstick?" Now, it's not unusual for one male rocker to say to another "May I
borrow your eye liner?" ' ") (quoting LIBERACE, supra, at 222); id. C" I was the first to create
shock waves,' he said. 'For me to wear a simple tuxedo on-stage would be like asking Marlene
Deitrich to wear a housedress.' ") (quoting BOB THOMAS, LIBERACE 243 (1987)). Madonna
has even been called the female Andy Warhol of the nineties, a conscious and inspired manipu-
lator of pop culture, who will do for women's sexuality what Warhol did for gay male sexuality,
making what was previously unspeakable "hip." JoAnn Wypijewski, Pictures from an Exhibi-
tion, THE NATION, Dec. 14, 1992, at 744, 748 (reviewing MADONNA, SEx (1992)).
12. MADONNA, supra note 1, at 2.
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rounded breast, punctuating the voluptuousness of the masturbatory moment
is printed: "WARNING! ADULTS ONLY! EXCLUSIVE SPECIAL CD
INSIDE." This warning is followed by the book's price and a fairly large bar
code. Lest we think that we are being allowed a peek at Madonna's private
sexual fantasies, the bar code, in particular, reveals that what we are viewing is
akin to a public performance of sex that refuses to hide its commercial charac-
ter. Prospective buyers can't even leaf through the goods in the bookstore to
see if it turns them on. The mylar jacket thus serves as the first of many
signals indicating who's in charge here. 3
The pages of Sex are spirally bound between hard aluminum covers and
contain a collage of text and photographs that, taken either collectively or as
discrete images or ideas, presumably signifies sex. Some may conclude that
the rigid permanence of Sex is to the vulnerability of its mylar jacket as the
stable core of unmodified female sexuality is to the accommodating "idea-
tional envelope" 14 known as fetishized woman. Others may observe that
although the manifestation of Madonna's sexuality in Sex is tangible and rigid,
the ideas being represented are far more fluid and plastic.
Madonna begins the book with an introductory statement or disclaimer:
This book is about sex.... These are fantasies I have dreamed up.
Like most human beings, when I let my mind wander, when I let
myself go, I rarely think of condoms. My fantasies take place in a
perfect world, a place without AIDS. Unfortunately the world is not
perfect and I know that condoms are not only necessary but
mandatory. Everything you are about to see and read is a fantasy, a
dream, pretend.... And by the way, any similarity between charac-
ters and events depicted in this book and real persons and events is
not only purely coincidental, it's ridiculous. Nothing in this book is
true. I made it all up. 5
We thus know a few important things about what Madonna wants us to un-
derstand about the book. To the extent she creates images or text in which she
plays with power and danger as part of her pleasure, she does so consensually
and erotically, in a perfect world unspoiled by AIDS. Subordination, domina-
tion, golden showers, voyeurism, butch, femme, exhibitionism, homosexuality,
heterosexuality, group sex, cross-dressing, and animals are all fair game in
Madonna's fantasy world. Here, desire is the handmaiden of the sex/gender
13. The mylar sheath or condom in which the book is enveloped has one further signifi-
cance. Purchasers can't return the book once its jacket has been slit open, torn back, or gently
removed. In effect, then, the very opening of the book diminishes its value. She forces a reading
of the book into a complicitous act of consumption. She makes you take it; she makes it yours.
14. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 529 (1982) ("Feminist inquiry into [the materiality of women's lives]
began with a broad unmasking of the attitudes that legitimize and hide women's status, the
ideational envelope that contains woman's body.").
15. MADONNA, supra note 1, at 2.
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power play. It is a world that has filtered out acceptable from unacceptable
danger:
Sex was like a game to her like Jeopardyl or Hollywood Squares, like
Monopoly or Trivial Pursuit. Her body was a weapon, not a fatal
weapon, more like a stun gun, more like a fun gun. She did it to
remind everybody that she could bring happiness or she could bring
danger, kind of like the lone ranger, only the horse she rode in on
was high. She was an avenger of the libido dead, a sister of mercy,
our lady of head. 6
Whether one finds Madonna's images exciting, boring, irrelevant,
thought-provoking, offensively self-indulgent, or a prime example of how wo-
men's sexuality is merely a fetishized construction of the masculinist economy
of power, Sex provides an interesting opportunity to consider the possibility of
a female sexual subject. 7 In other words, is it possible for Madonna, or for
any woman, to describe a set of fantasies as her own? What does it mean or
what can it mean when a woman says that she has certain types of desires?
Sex and much of Madonna's other work 8 challenge head-on the norms
that render certain expressions of women's sexuality unspeakable. For this
reason, the importance of Madonna's work19 does not depend on whether she
is engaging in a conscious effort to broaden the scope and meaning of women's
sexuality within the dominant discourse or merely has a good nose for exploit-
ing popular culture to economic advantage. Whatever she's up to, she has had
a profound effect on popular culture.
FEMALE SEXUAL AGENCY
Feminist theorists have devoted significant attention to the question of a
true or objective female sexual subject.2' Similarly, many feminist legal theo-
rists have endeavored to develop "a jurisprudence built upon feminist insights
16. MADONNA, supra note 1, at 102.
17. See MANDY MERCK, PERVERSIONS 85 (1993) ("Madonna may seem to be the most
self-authored sexual artifact of this (or any other) time, but her career coincides with the femi-
nist revaluation of long-held positions on pornography, fashion and sexual conduct.").
18. See infra notes 96-97.
19. In recent years a growing number of academics have looked to Madonna as a signifi-
cant subject of scholarly inquiry. See, eg., THE MADONNA CONNECTION (Cathy
Schwichtenberg ed., 1993); D. David Bourland, Jr., Sex A Reyiew of Revleis, 50 ETC.: REV.
GEN. SEMANTIcS 96 (1993); Pico Iyor, The Contagion of Innocence, 9 NEw; PESP. Q. 34
(1991); Jane Miller, Madonna (Traces of Struggle and Desire), 17 PLOUGHSHARES 221 (1991);
M. Carmen Africa Vidal, The Death of Politics and Sex in the Eighties Show, 24 NEw' LITER-
ARY Hisr. 171 (1993).
20. See generally MARY F. BELINKY, BLYTHE M. CLINCHY, NANCY R. GOLDBERGER &
JILL M. TARULE, WoMEN's WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE, AND
MIND (1986); NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978); DIANA FUSS, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM,
NATURE & DIFFERENCE (1960); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
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into women's true nature, rather than masculine insights into 'human' na-
ture."'" If such an objective female exists, how would she express herself and
how would we recognize her if we saw her? These questions have generated a
wealth of literature analyzing the nature of desire, gender, sex, and sexuality,
and whether such fundamental concepts are the products of biology, social
construction, language, a masculinist or phallocentric hegemony, or any com-
bination thereof.22 While disagreeing about the validity of either these ques-
tions or the possible answers to them, virtually all radical feminists agree that
notions of femininity and masculinity (i.e., gender) are socially constructed. 23
It is important to distinguish this basic agreement about gender from the
general acceptance by most contemporary feminist legal scholars of the stabil-
ity of the male and female sexual categories. 24 The normative future of femi-
nist legal theory lies in extending the deconstruction of gender and sex roles to
sex itself, thereby forcing a crisis of category altogether.
The new work of radical feminists assumes that deconstruction of gender
has already taken place and asks how we reconstruct notions of woman,
knowing, sexuality, power, and agency.2" This reconstructive project has pro-
duced profound disagreement about the task of feminist theory and practice.
Some scholars argue that we must endeavor to uncover and liberate our objec-
tive, true selves from the mark of culture by transcending masculinist con-
21. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1988).
22. See, e.g., SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Vin-
tage Books 1974) (1949) (arguing that gender is acquired); JUDITH P. BUTLER, GENDER
TROUBLE (1990) (developing a conception of sexed, gendered, and sexual identity as performna-
tive rather than essential in nature); FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE (Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cor-
nell eds., 1987) (reconstructing the relationship between 20th century Marxism and feminism),
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) (concluding that our experience
of woman as male sexual fantasy is produced by a hegemonic male gaze); SEX AND SCIENTIFIC
INQUIRY (Sandra G. Harding & Jean F. O'Barr eds., 1987) (stating that socially constructed
biological differences underlie the essentialization of sex differences); MONIQUE WiTTio, THE
LESBIAN BODY (David LeVey trans., Peter Owen 1975) (1973) (arguing that language can be
used to overthrow the idea of sex as a mode of domination).
23. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 22, at 6-7, 36-38; CYNTHIA F. EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE
DISTINCTIONS; SEX, GENDER, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1988); GENDER/BODY/KNOWL-
EDGE/FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF BEING AND KNOWING (Alison Jagger & Susan R.
Bordo eds., 1989); NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH (1991); Susan W. Baker, Biological
Influences on Human Sex and Gender, in WOMEN: SEX AND SEXUALITY 175 (Catherine R.
Stimpson & Ethel S. Person eds., 1980).
24. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 22, at 8-9, 33, 128-31; THERESA DE LAURETIS, TECH-
NOLOGIES OF GENDER: ESSAYS ON THEORY, FILM, AND FICTION (1987); ANN FAUSTO-STER-
LING, MYTHS OF GENDER: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES ABOUT WOMEN AND MEN (1992);
DONNA J. HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE
(1991); THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO
FREUD (1990); SERENA NANDA, NEITHER MAN NOR WOMAN: THE HIJRAS OF INDIA (1990).
25. See, e.g., DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY,
METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (Sandra Harding & Merrill B.
Hintikka eds., 1983); NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE AND GEN-
DER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY (1989); MARY Jo FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL
FEMINISM (1992); DENISE RILEY, "AM I THAT NAME?': FEMINISM AND THE CATEGORY OF
"WOMEN" IN HISTORY (1988); JOAN W. SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY
(1988).
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struction, as if stripping away layers of paint.26 Others view gender as a
secondary characteristic that marks a prior human subject, working within the
existing discourse in order first to subvert and destabilize it, and then to con-
struct it anew.27 Still other writers conclude that to posit a true or authentic
sexuality existing prior to or behind power is not only politically unwise but
also culturally incoherent.2" These different perspectives on the ontology of a
pregendered subject provide useful theoretical lenses through which to view
both Madonna's Sex and the debate surrounding the feminist project of
reconstruction.
A. Essentialism: A View From Solid Ground
Essentialist feminists maintain that feminist inquiry must concern itself
with the discovery and liberation of an essential woman who lurks beneath a
world constructed by men. 29 These theorists remain committed to a situa-
tional metaphysics that considers the oppression of women as stemming from
a masculinist economy that shapes how women come to know ourselves.30
Catharine MacKinnon argues that "gender has no basis in anything other
than the social reality its hegemony constructs. ' 31 On this account, feminists
should strive towards "a broad unmasking of the attitudes that legitimize and
hide women's status, the ideational envelope that contains woman's body."
32
MacKinnon's ontological references to "woman's body,'" 33 "women's point of
26. The work of Catharine MacKinnon and Robin West represents this tradition within
the legal community. See, e.g., MAcKINNON, supra note 22; MacKinnon, supra note 14; Catha-
rine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Afethod and the State: Toward Feminist Jurispru-
dence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 181 (Katharine T. Bartlett &
Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence]; Cath-
arine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321 (1984) [hereinafter
MacKinnon, Not A Moral Issue]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and
Speech, 20 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Pornograph; Civil
Rights and Speech]; Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives A Phenomeno-
logical Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WotEN's L.J. 81 (1987) [hereinafter West,
The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives]; West, supra note 21.
27. See, eg., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLU-
SION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); WITTIG, supra note 22; Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race Re-
form and Retrenchment" Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARv. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
28. See e.g., BUTLER, supra note 22, at 4-5; THERESA DE LAURETIS, AucE DOESN'T:
FEmiSM, SEMIOTICS, CINEMA (1984); Fuss, supra note 20; JULIA KRisTEVA, THE KJS-
TEVA READER (1987); TORIL MOI, SEXUA/TIFx'TUAL POLITICS: FaINIST LITERARY THE-
ORY (1985); GAYATRI C. SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL POLITICS
(1987); MONIQUE WITrIG, THE STRAIGHT MIND (1992); Barbara Johnson, Metaphor, Meton-
ymy and Voice in Their Eyes Were Watching God, in BLACK LrERATURE & LITERARY THE-
ORY 205 (Henry L. Gates, Jr., ed., 1984).
29. E.g., MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, supra note 26, at 11.
30. See, eg., GILLIGAN, supra note 20; Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Seifi A
Preliminary Inquiry into the Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U. L. REv. 217 (1988) (reviewing
MAcKiN oN, supra note 22); West, supra note 21.
31. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, supra note 26, at 13.
32. MacKinnon, supra note 14, at 529.
33. Id.
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view, '' 34 "women's experience,"' ' and to what women "really want" 6
evidence her underlying belief in the existence of a metaphysically distinct
female subject, a raw and undominated essence raped by the sexist hegemony
that dominates and shapes the world. From her privileged standpoint outside,
beneath, or above the dominant discourse, MacKinnon concludes that women
can only experience themselves as male sexual fantasies and that "pornogra-
phy constructs what a woman is as what men want from sex."' 37 MacKin-
non's central and most powerful insight is of woman as fetish. This notion
underlies her now famous syntactic analysis of sex-based power relations:
"Man fucks woman; subject verb object."
'38
Robin West similarly believes in the essential female subject, focusing on
the specific material and existential conditions of women's lives that are ig-
nored by a masculinist jurisprudence. 39 For West, a woman's essence is
grounded in her unique capacity to menstruate, experience penile penetration,
become pregnant, and breast feed.4' These female faculties make up West's
conception of the experience of femininity. West thus answers the question,
"What is a woman?," by pointing to a set of material and existential events.
This set, however, fails to capture the lives and experiences of a great number
of people who think of themselves as women. Her classification of women as
menstruating, penetrated, pregnant, breast-feeding persons suffers from the
same narrowness of perspective as that of the ungendered human at the core
of masculinist jurisprudence. By referring frequently to "women's true na-
ture,' '42 "women's humanity, '43 "women's subjective lives,"" and "women's
conception of value,"' 45 West echoes MacKinnon's reliance upon the meta-
physical and moral authenticity of a singular, coherent female subject who,
according to West, "officially values intimacy" while really harboring "subjec-
tive desires to the contrary.
'4 6
In fact, distinguishing objective values from subjective desires is no easy
task. West tells us that the violent nature of male sexuality causes women to
"define themselves as 'giving selves' so as to obviate the threat, the danger, the
34. MACKINNON, supra note 22, at 88, 91, 160; MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurispru-
dence, supra note 26, at 182; MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, supra note 26, at 323, 344.
35. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 26, at 182.
36. MAcKINNON, supra note 22, at 83.
37. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, supra note 26, at 17.
38. MacKinnon, supra note 14, at 541.
39. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 26, at 81-83; West, supra
note 21, at 3; see also Scales, supra note 3, at 444.
40. West, supra note 21, at 3.
41. Unfortunately, some of West's writing fail to distinguish clearly between the experi-
ence of femininity and the state of being female, or between a conception of sex as an essential
part of women's true nature as opposed to an accidental property of female humans. See id. at
4,42, 53.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 54.
45. Id. at 28.
46. Id. at 53.
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pain, and the fear of being self-regarding selves from whom their sexuality is
taken."'47 Because women "respond to this fear by re-constituting themselves
in a way that controls the danger and suppresses the fear," and because "men
do not experience the fear of violent sexuality as a part of their self-definition,"
women and men "live in two separate realities."48 The outcome of both West's
and MacKinnon's essentialist metaphysics is a female faux-sexuality that al-
lows us to believe that what hurts us feels good and that what subjugates us
fulfills our erotic desires.
The essentialist viewpoint reasons that sex (meaning woman) is to gender
(meaning feminine) as the real is to the experienced, as the raw is to the
cooked. Women share an epistemological standpoint and a phenomenological
history defined by our bodies and the oppressive hegemony created by the men
in power. Thankfully, MacKinnon and West have escaped its merciless grasp
by discovering that what women consider real, natural, and inevitable (albeit
unpleasant) is, in fact, constructed and oppressive. From this vantage point,
MacKinnon in particular has set out to shine a light upon the possibility of
transcendent agency.
For the essentialist, "woman" is a unitary and coherent entity; it denotes
an intelligible and transcendent pregendered ontological subject. In order to
liberate the identity of the true female from the mark of culture, however,
MacKinnon and West must completely transform meaning and signification
for female agency to emerge. They diagnose the problem as epistemological
impairment: women's inability to know our real selves and our inclination to
confuse the object of male sexual desire with a true female sexual subject. This
essentialist critique of sexism proposes a radical rethinking of our understand-
ing of consent, equality, and autonomy and has garnered tremendous support
from many women who see in it a reflection of our own experiences.
For essentialists, no doubt, Sex represents proof of the metaphysical
perfection of the patriarchal construction of women's desire. Madonna's pub-
lic declaration that her fantasies (involving subordination, masochism, bond-
age, heterosexuality, exhibitionism, and rape) can feel good, make her feel
sexy, and give her pleasure is for them a prime example of how women's sexu-
ality and desire are products of a violent male sexual fantasy:
In pornography, women desire dispossession and cruelty. Men, per-
mitted to put words (and other things) in women's mouths, create
scenes in which women desperately want to be bound, battered, tor-
tured, humiliated and killed. Or, merely taken and used. This is
erotic to the male point of view. Subjection itself, with self-determi-
nation ecstatically relinquished, is the content of women's sexual de-
sire and desirability.49
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On this account, it is incoherent for Madonna to say that these are her fanta-
sies50 and really mean it, because women lack the epistemological balls, as it
were, to have fantasies of their own.
51
But then, Madonna and MacKinnon come at this issue from completely
different perspectives. All Madonna wants to say is something about herself:
these are my fantasies, you go get your own.5 2 MacKinnon wants to tell Ma-
donna and all women what their fantasies are, or should be. 3 Madonna
learns about herself by playing with herself: "I love my pussy, it is the com-
plete summation of my life. It's the place where all the most painful things
have happened. But it has given me indescribable pleasure. My pussy is the
temple of learning. ' '5 MacKinnon, on the other hand, achieves self-knowl-
edge by leaving her body and pleasure behind. In fact, MacKinnon stands
squarely against the idea that we "can fuck our way to freedom.""5
While resort to a theory of a transcendent, metaphysical woman is attrac-
tive in many respects, it is also vulnerable to criticism at numerous
50. MADONNA, supra note 1, at 2.
51. MacKinnon is also unable to see any possibility for female sexual agency in lesbianism:
Lesbian sex, simply as sex between women, does not by definition transcend the ero-
tization of dominance and submission and their social equation with masculinity and
femininity. Butch/femme as sexual (not just gender) role playing, together with paral-
lels in lesbian sadomasochism's "top" and "bottom," suggest to me that sexual con-
formity extends far beyond gender object mores.
MacKinnon, supra note 14, at 534 n.42. Joan Nestle, a lesbian-femme theorist, has powerfully
challenged this hegemonic notion of lesbian sexuality:
A fern is often seen as a lesbian acting like a straight woman who is not a feminist-a
terrible misreading of self-presentation which turns a language of liberated desire into
the silence of collaboration. An erotic conversation between two women is completely
unheard, not by men this time but by other women, many in the name of lesbian-
feminism.
Joan Nestle, The Fem Question, in PLEASURE AND DANGER 232, 236 (Carole S. Vance ed.,
1984); see also LESLIE FEINBERG, STONE BUTCH BLUES (1993) (chronicling and celebrating
the power, pleasure, and pain of the life of a stone butch).
52. See Nightline: Interview with Madonna (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 3, 1990)
("The feminists' point of view? Well, I would like to point out that they're missing a couple of
things, because... I may be dressing like the typical bimbo... but... I'm in charge of my
fantasies."), quoted in Mary Jo Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished
Draft), 105 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1053 (1992).
53. MacKinnon's message to Madonna is similar to lesbian-feminism's judgment of fem-
mes as the "Uncle Toms of the movement." Nestle, supra note 51, at 236.
Politically correct sexuality is a paradoxical concept. One of the most deeply held
opinions in feminism is that women should be autonomous and self-directed in defin-
ing their sexual desire, yet when a women says, 'This is my desire,' feminists rush in to
say, 'No, no, it is the prick in your head; women should not desire that act.' But we
do not yet know enough at all about what women-any women-desire. The real
problem here is that we stopped asking questions so early in the lesbian and feminist
movement, that we rushed to erect what appeared to be answers into the formidable
and rigid edifice that it is now.
Id. at 234.
54. MADONNA, supra note 1, at 75.
55. MACKINNON, supra note 22, at 219. As Mary Jo Frug has stated, "[i]t seems indispu-
table that Madonna's version of the female sexualized body is radically more autonomous and
self-serving than MacKinnon's interpretation .... ." Frug, supra note 52, at 1054.
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junctures.56 In effect, it amounts to the easy way out. First, MacKinnon pro-
vides an inadequate explanation of just how she was able to slip through the
"metaphysically nearly perfect"5 net of the masculinist epistemology. She
explains that "women live in the world pornography creates. We live its lie as
reality .... ,,s How are we to appreciate or trust MacKinnon's truth-telling?
Since we have all been so profoundly alienated from our true selves, it is un-
clear how MacKinnon was able to escape the dehumanizing (or dewomaniz-
ing) effect of male hegemony. We are supposed to take it on faith that she has
successfully avoided the reification of her own oppression and hasn't just re-
packaged it in forceful, persuasive, and dynamic rhetoric. MacKinnon pro-
vides no account for how we can pierce the veil of our ontological ignorance
for even a moment and take a peek through the thick mist of hegemony at our
true selves.59 Indeed, MacKinnon has set up a metaphysical framework under
which any argument with the normative priority of her essentialist subject is
labeled either impossible or proof of false consciousness.
It would be unfair, however, to deny the revolutionary power of MacKin-
non's central insights. In combining a traditional, realist metaphysics with
more contemporary notions of social construction and hegemony, she has bril-
liantly deconstructed the concept of woman as male sexual fantasy. What she
has done (although she does not use this terminology) is expose a metonymic6°
model of woman as male sexual fantasy by laying bare the role that the male
gaze plays in giving meaning to what we know as woman.
Her mistake lies in substituting an objectivist metaphysics for the meto-
nymic model of woman as sexual object. MacKinnon's discourse on transcen-
dental meaning and truth is a step back from her dazzling insights about male
hegemony, for central to her conclusions about women's true nature is the
traditionally realist assumption that "[if human beings are to have real
56. "MacKinnon's answers are crisp, radical, elegant, and eloquent, if also dated, essen-
tialist, and somewhat unsatisfying." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Book Review, 16 SIGNS 603, 603
(1991) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE (1989)).
57. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 26, at 182.
58. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, supra note 26, at 335.
59. MacKinnon has answered by referring to "the feminist concept of the personal as
political." MacKinnon, supra note 14, at 534. "[W]omen's distinctive experience as women
occurs within that sphere that has been socially lived as the personal... so that what it is to
know the politics of women's situation is to know women's personal lives.... Its claim to
women's perspective is its claim to the truth." Id. at 535-36. This defense of the methodology
of consciousness-raising provides no answer, however, for how MacKinnon or any woman can
step outside of the language and culture that have produced the notion of woman as male sexual
object. Given the importance and power of hegemony in her theory, how can more talk in a
bankrupt language allow women to make authoritative and intelligible claims about truth?
Placing the female subject in epistemological receivership, that is, in a regime that highly regu-
lates discourse, fails to address the underlying flaws in the system.
60. Metonymy, a basic characteristic of human cognition, refers to situations in which a
subcategory or stereotype of a larger category stands for the category as a whole. See GEORGE
LAKoFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE
MIND 77-90 (1987) (discussing metonymic models of cognition).
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knowledge, then the idiosyncrasies of human organisms had better not get in
the way.",
6 1
Both MacKinnon and West are unwilling to view sex in a manner that
admits the power and truth of metonymy. In fact, each author substitutes her
own metonymic model of woman for the one constructed by the male gaze.
By doing so in the name of a real world that creates objective truth conditions,
they cut off an array of epistemological possibilities. They erect an ideological
portcullis that blocks all avenues of self-knowledge that deviate from those
available under either the male or the official feminist gaze.
Indeed, the essentialists engage in the same "epistemological imperial-
ism"' 62 of which they accuse men. By insisting upon the normative priority of
a female subject who holds a unitary and univocal point of view outside our
identity constructed by male hegemony, MacKinnon and West have con-
structed a metaphysical model that "deploys precisely the imperialist strate-
gies that feminism ought to criticize. ' 63 By grounding the legitimacy of their
theory upon transcendent truth about women's nature, they have replaced a
transcultural notion of patriarchy with their own colonizing epistemology.
Like the post-structuralist theorists, MacKinnon and West view gender as a
performance in which women act out their own subordination but do not par-
ticipate in writing the script. Unlike the post-structuralists, however, the es-
sentialists argue that the task of feminist practice is to transform our lives
from fiction to fact, from script to nature."4 For instance, MacKinnon sug-
gests that the passive, unidirectional nature of women's relationship to lan-
guage is as ineffective as a woman in a theater shouting to stop a pornographic
movie.65 In response, MacKinnon suggests that the projector be turned off.
Yet, women are no less silenced once the theater has been closed. We are just
left sitting in the dark. Her assertion of a pregendered or unsignified I thus
seems quite impossible absent greater elaboration. In this respect, MacKin-
non's theory creates much heat, but sheds little light on the possibilities for
women's sexual agency.
One fundamental question remains unanswered in MacKinnon's work: is
her assertion of a pregendered, or resignified, I possible or even intelligible? In
fact, MacKinnon's theory points not toward the liberation of a de-hegemoni-
fled woman, but toward the dissolution of a coherent notion of woman alto-
gether. Once we disrobe the woman of the cultural and patriarchal
adornments that give the terms female and feminine meaning, who remains?
Why call it woman? The term woman may thus become unintelligible once
61. Id. at 174.
62. BUTLER, supra note 22, at 13, 35, 142-47.
63. Id. at 147.
64. "I say, give women equal power in social life. Let what we say matter .... Take your
foot off our necks, then we will hear in what tongue women speak." MACKINNON, supra note
22, at 45.
65. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 6 (1993).
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abstracted from its culturally coherent, albeit oppressive, context." To ag-
gressively inscribe a true female subject in the discursive space that is uncov-
ered by MacKinnon's deconstruction of the male gaze reveals her
overidentification with male power. Such profound insights about the nature
of women's oppression demand a more sophisticated account of the relation-
ship between power and identity.
B. Post-Structuralism: A Strategic Perspective on Sex
For post-structuralist feminists, essentialism simply fails to go far
enough. To assume, uncritically, the integrity of a pre-discursive agent is to
fail to grasp the constitutive nature of signification.67 Constructionist theorists
argue that any claim for an acontextual, ahistorical I is both impossible and
incoherent. "If identity is asserted through a process of signification, if iden-
tity is always already signified, and yet continues to signify as it circulates
within various interlocking discourses, then the question of agency is not to be
answered through recourse to an T that preexists signification."
68
Without succumbing to the dead-end, solipsistic nihilism of some of the
pioneering French post-structuralists, feminist and queer theorists have re-
cently begun to consider female sexual agency not as a matter of transcending
patriarchal hegemony, but as a subversive, discursive strategy. 69 Building on
the work of Derrida70 and Foucault,
71 Judith Butler, 72 Barbara Johnson,
7 3
66. Numerous writers have objected to MacKinnon's myopic metaphysics, arguing that
her deconstruction of male social power fails to recognize the hegemonic dynamics of racism,
heterosexism, classism, as well as the ways in which these practices do more than merely accu-
mulate additional burdens on top of our primary experience of oppression as women. See, eg.,
Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence" Grounding the Theories, 4 BEzRKELEY WOMEN'S LJ.
191, 202 (1989-90) (criticizing MacKinnon's neglect of lesbian experience); Kimberl6 Cren-
shaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex. A Black Feminist Critique of Antidis-
crimination Doctrine Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 157
(critiquing the white feminist attempt to view sexual identity as more primary than race or class
based identity); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Thcory, 42 STAN. L
REv. 581, 591 (1990), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 26, at 235, 242 (criti-
cizing MacKinnon's marginalization of black women).
67. See eg., BUTLER, supra note 22, at 4 ("The suggestion that feminism can seek wider
representation for a subject that it itself constructs has the ironic consequence that feminist
goals risk failure by refusing to take account of the constitutive powers of their own representa-
tional claims."); Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis
in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS 405 (1988) (discussing the progression in feminist theory from
essentialism to post-structuralism to the recent work on subjectivity by Teresa de Lauretis and
Denise Riley, among others); Butler, supra note 7, at 13-14.
68. BUTLER, supra note 22, at 143. Always already has become the oft-vilified motto of
Derridian post-structuralism, sometimes sloppily used in deconstructive theory as a founda-
tional substitute for essentialism. For an interesting discussion of the use and abuse of aivays
already in deconstructionist theory, see Fuss, supra note 20, at 15.
69. See eg., INSIDE/OuT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES, supra note 7.
70. See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMiMATOLOGY (Gayatri C. Spivak trans.,
Johns Hopkins University Press 1976) (1967); JACQUES DERRIDA, WRIT1NG AND DIFFERENCE
(Alan Bass trans., University of Chicago Press 1978) (1967).
71. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF
THE HUMAN SCIENCES (RD. Laing ed., Vintage Books 1973) (1966). Michel Foucault chal-
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and Monique Wittig74 (among others) have challenged feminists to recognize
how language has the power to create social reality. Each day we rise and "do
gender" in how we dress, speak, interact with others, and understand our-
selves. We participate in and construct a signifying economy in which we
perform daily according to the juridical rules that give meaning and bounda-
ries to terms such as woman, female, and sex. Understanding the public,
performative, and historical aspects of gender and sex is thus essential to the
possibility of female sexual agency.
The conception of sex as a process finds its roots in Simone de Beauvoir's
claim that one is not born a woman, but rather becomes one.75 If this is true,
then women cannot be said to have an ahistorical truth before the mark of
linguistic signification. Post-structuralist feminists thus charge that the essen-
tialist call to transcend language in order to discover woman's real essence is
fundamentally incoherent.76
Construction is not opposed to agency; it is the necessary scene of
agency, the very terms in which agency is articulated and becomes
culturally intelligible. The critical task for feminism is not to estab-
lish a point of view outside of constructed identities ... [but] to
locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by those construc-
tions, to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through partici-
pating in precisely those practices of repetition that constitute
identity and, therefore, present the imminent possibility of con-
testing them.77
Unsatisfied by the essentialists' commitment to a humanist vision of a
core volitional agent, post-structuralist feminists conceive of human subjectiv-
lenged the idea of sexed subjects by proposing a raw, original sexuality that is recontextualized
through power relations into the male and female sexes. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1980)
(1976). His model is unsatisfactory, however, for it assumes that power and sexuality are onto-
logically distinct. Like the essentialist feminists, Foucault misconstrued the inherent relation-
ship between power and sexuality, between power and desire. Feminist post-structuralists have
built upon Foucault's analysis but have rejected the idea that "the agency of repression and the
object of repression be ontologically distinct. Indeed, repression may be understood to produce
the object that it comes to deny." BUTLER, supra note 22, at 93.
72. JUDITH P. BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER at x (1993) ("[T]he materiality of sex is
constructed through a ritualized repetition of norms.").
73. Barbara Johnson, Thresholds of Difference: Structures of Address in Zora Neale Hur-
ston, 12 CRITICAL INQUIRY 278 (1985) (a white female academic exploring how Hurston, a
Black female novelist, understands what it means to be colored).
74. Monique Wittig, The Mark of Gender, FEMINIST ISSUES, Fall 1985, at 3, 5-6. Gender
is an effect produced by a heterosexual, male system of signification that comprises a coercive
contract between language and bodies. The category gender therefore enslaves.
75. DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 22, at 301. Drucilla Cornell argues that de Beauvoir's the-
ory of "becoming" is grounded in a conception of the subject that, like MacKinnon's, is essen-
tially masculine. DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION 191-93 (1991).
76. BUTLER, supra note 22, at 4-5.
77. Id. at 147.
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ity as an "emergent property of a historicized experience.""8 In other words,
identity is produced through our experiences, both as subjects and objects of
social construction. Drucilla Cornell and other post-structuralists believe that
feminism should deconstruct sex into its constitutive acts and locate those acts
within the compulsory framework that regulates the social appearance of
sex. 9 Rather than searching for points of exit from social construction, then,
the feminist project should be to discover points of entry. Construed in this
way, consciousness is a strategy, a historical practice of deliberately manipu-
lating meaning through the use of juridical, linguistic, and semiotic tools."
Consciousness is thus not a pre-discursive foundation that renders experience
possible but rather the effect of experience.
With these ideas in mind, does Madonna's Sex facilitate or deconstruct
her own objectification? In a sexual economy in which certain terms must
have static meaning for heteromasculinity 1 to retain its power, one can inter-
pret Madonna to be playing with the meanings of sex, pleasure, heterosexual-
ity, consent, and the female body. Through hyperbole, syncopation,
exaggeration, and the proliferation of inharmonious depictions of desire, Ma-
donna has created a cacophony of meaning that destabilizes the dominant
construction of female sexuality.
Like MacKinnon, Madonna proposes an impossible fantasy. But Ma-
donna's fantasy is only impossible in the sense that she sets out to write the
unspeakable, portray the unthinkable, and sing the unheard of, whereas
MacKinnon amplifies the power of patriarchal images of women by rendering
them ineffable. Whereas MacKinnon wants to shut down the discourse, Ma-
donna challenges it head-on. She does so by repeating words and engaging in
practices (which MacKinnon would find harmful and dangerous), declaring
them sex. Madonna challenges the juridical power of dominant meaning from
within the framework of that discourse. From within, she presents a stronger
challenge than MacKinnon can from without.
The legal treatment of homosexuality provides a good example of how
danger can always be found in the unspeakable.82 Many sodomy statutes
78. Alcoff, supra note 67, at 43 1.
79. Drcuila Cornell & Adam Thurschwell, Feminism, Negativity Intersubjectivity, in
FEmNiSM AS CRrITQuE, supra note 22, at 143, 143.
80. "By seizing the opportunity to interpret and reinterpret the many levels on which por-
nography's meaning operates, while attacking coercion, we can have a role in redefining sexual-
ity through what may be the only means available." Susan E. Keller, Viewling and Doing:
Complicating Pornography's Meaning, 81 GEO. LJ. 2195, 2242 (1993).
81. Heteromasculinity refers to the unstable object lying at the intersection of compulsory
heterosexuality and sexism. For a thoughtful discussion of the interrelationship between heter-
osexuality and masculinity, see EVE K. SEDGWICK, BETWEEN M EN: ENGLISH LrrERATuRE
AND MALE HoMosocIAL DESIRE (1985); EvE K. SEDOWICK, TENDENCIES (1993).
82. Of course, homosexuality is not alone in its relegation to the margins ofspeakability in
an attempt to stabilize the integrity of "normal" sex. Women's sexuality and sex between peo-
ple of different races have long been policed through the inarticulate prosecution of deviance-
inarticulate in the sense that the law need not expressly state what it prohibits when euphemism
or innuendo communicates coherently. See eg., State v. Daniel, 75 So. 836, 836 (La. 1917)
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make no effort to define the particular kinds of acts they seek to criminalize.
Rather, they refer to culturally coherent yet phenomenologically vague events
such as the "infamous crime against nature," 3 "the abominable and detesta-
ble crime against nature," 4 or "unnatural and lascivious acts,"' 5 to name only
a few. Significantly, several courts have upheld these statutes in the face of
challenges on vagueness grounds,86 in one case holding that "the charge was
too horrible to contemplate and too revolting to discuss."87
The unspeakability of the crime of homosexuality, that is, the crime of
deviance from compulsory heterosexual norms, is evident in such bastions of
legal tradition as Blackstone and the United States Supreme Court. Quoting
from the touchstone of legal meaning and history, Chief Justice Burger cited
Blackstone on "'the infamous crime against nature'.., an offense of 'deeper
malignity' than rape, a heinous act 'the very mention of which is a disgrace to
human nature' and 'a crime not fit to be named.' "88
By criminalizing unmentionable acts on the correct assumption that we
all know what behavior the law is designed to proscribe, the law performs an
act of juridical circumcision-a purification of meaning and negation of devi-
ance. "We won't say it. Therefore it doesn't exist." Yet, the rendering of
such sexual behavior as outlaw necessarily includes an affirmation of that
same behavior. Indeed, the coherence of permitted behavior is fully depen-
dent upon the existence of the prohibited "other": deviance is necessary to the
constitution and invention of normalized heterosexuality, masculinity, and
femininity. 9 In this sense, it is as if acts proscribed by law lurk just below the
surface of "proper" discourse, tempting us, while marginalized and repressed
through linguistic, behavioral, and juridical enforcement. The unthinkable is
thus fully within the culture, but fully excluded from the dominant culture.
Norms regulating the meaning of gender and sexual orientation fall squarely
within this notion of speakability and unspeakability. In this regard, hetero-
sexuality is made "original" and "natural" through an ongoing process of
("Concubinage is a term of such generally known meaning that it was not necessary for the
Legislature to give it a legislative definition in the law condemning concubinage between a white
person and a colored person.").
83. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411 to -1412 (Supp. 1988).
84. FLA. STAT. ch. 800.02 (1987).
85. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 34 (1986).
86. See, e.g., Blake v. State, 124 A.2d 273 (Md. 1956) (holding that the statutory term
"unnatural or perverted practices" is not unconstitutionally vague and uncertain); Common-
wealth v. LeRoux, 421 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (section prohibiting "unnatural and
lascivious acts" did not fail to put defendant on notice that conduct was prohibited).
87. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1148 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
88. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215).
89. See Jonathan N. Katz, The Invention of Homosexuality, 20 SOCIALIST REV. 7 (1990)
(discussing the late 19th-century effort to stabilize dominant meanings of sexuality through the
invention of a "homosexual" category, which occurred prior to the invention of a "heterosex-
ual" category).
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compulsive, almost obsessive, linguistic, behavioral, and juridical repetition.90
This form of meaning is grounded in a coerced compulsive truth. 91
In another sense, certain sexual norms have been repeated so frequently
and so pervasively that they no longer need to be spoken. They have, by vir-
tue of their compulsive and compulsory repetition, become true, natural, as-
sumed, and beyond question. Through unchallenged repetition over time,
they have rendered their negation unintelligible. Into this category fall the
meanings of male and female. That sex is determined by biology, genitalia,
nature is beyond doubt. The work of repetitive significance has been done. To
deny the truth of "all humans with penises are men" is to utter something
unintelligible, akin to denying that "all bachelors are unmarried men." This
form of unspeakability--even unthinkability-is a constructed tautology.9
2
The task for post-structuralist theory is to identify and deconstruct the
unspeakable and/or unspoken, in both the senses described above. It is in our
definitions of effability that the policing of meaning and ultimately oppression
take place:
It becomes important to recognize that oppression works not merely
through acts of overt prohibition, but covertly, through the constitu-
tion of viable subjects and through the corollary constitution of a
domain of unviable (un)subjects--abjects, we might call them-who
are neither named nor prohibited within the economy of the law.
Here oppression works through the production of a domain of un-
thinkability and unnameabilty. 93
C. Beyond Essentialism." Reconstructing Desire
"I'll teach you how to fuck."
94
"I wanted to be a slut at 16, but the costs were too high.
90. See Butler, supra note 7, at 21 ("[H]eterosexuality must be understood as a compulsive
and compulsory repetition that can only produce the effect of its own originality.").
91. This notion of truth that depends upon the systematic demarcation and coercive disci-
pline of deviation for its ongoing legitimacy is related to Pierre Bourdieu's theory of orthodoxy.
See Richard Terdiman, Translator's Introduction, in Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: To-
ward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 812 (Richard Terdiman trans.,
1987) ("[Orthodoxy is] correct, socially legitimized belief which is announced as a requirement
to which everyone must conform. Orthodoxy thus implies some degree of external control.").
92. Bourdieu's notion of doxa parallels this stronger idea of unspeakability. See Bourdieu,
supra note 91, at 848:
The law, an intrinsically powerful discourse coupled with the physical means to im-
pose compliance, can be seen as a quintessential instrument of normalization. As
such, given time, it passes from the status of 'orthodoxy,' proper belief explicitly defin-
ing what ought to happen, to the status of 'doxa,' the immediate agreement elicited by
that which is self-evident and normal. Indeed, doxa is a normalcy in which realization
of the norm is so complete that the norm itself, as coercion, simply ceases to exist as
such.
93. Butler, supra note 7, at 20.
94. MADONNA, supra note 1, at 6.
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Now, I can at least dress like one and hope."9
In Sex Madonna challenges head on the myth of unspeakability.
Throughout the book she overlays images of dominance and submission, sex
and violence, risk and safety, pleasure and pain, and consent and coercion. At
times, frames from the photographer's contact sheets are spliced, taped, or
stapled together to create an almost cinematic quality. The slight variations
between the frames produce the effect of movement across sexual categories
from lesbian to straight, from male to female, from butch to femme, from S/M
to Vanilla, and from group scenes to masturbation. Where one category ends
and the next begins is often unclear.
The idea of discursive repetition is not new for Madonna. Her music and
her videos are replete with references to cross-dressing, 96 juxtapositions of ir-
reverent words and images with venerable ones,97 and a surface play of gen-
der, race, and sex where intersexual and interracial differences are erased
through identical costuming, repetitive motions, and thematic word- and im-
age-play. 98 When viewed through a post-structuralist lens, these characteris-
tics of Madonna's work challenge the essentialist urge to stabilize whatever it
is that constitutes woman or women's desire.
Madonna uses her body as a metafeminine prop to mock static notions of
gender, sex, and sexuality. In this way she uses pastiche to reveal the plastic-
ity of those notions.99 Pastiche refers to a copy of a copy, a laying bare of the
constructed, performative nature of the so-called original through the use of
repetition, exaggeration, and proliferation. In contrast to parody, which pur-
ports to be a copy of an implicated original, pastiche denies the possibility of a
true original. By expressing an excess of femininity, Madonna asserts "that
femininity is a device" and "takes simulation to its limit in a deconstructive
maneuver that plays femininity off against itself-a metafemininity that
reduces gender to the overplay of style." 1" Madonna's occasional appropria-
tion of the Marilyn Monroe look exemplifies this sort of deconstruction, ex-
posing Monroe's status as male fantasy. Madonna's conscious and
deliberative overplay of femininity demonstrates that femininity is performa-
tive in the first instance.
Male drag expresses the same idea, exploding the notion that gender iden-
95. Lisa Duggan, The Anguished Cry of an 80's Fern: "I Want To Be A Drag Queen",
OUT/LoOK, Spring 1988, at 62-63.
96. See, e.g., MADONNA, Justify My Love, on THE IMMACULATE COLLECTION (Sire
Records 1990); MADONNA, Vogue, on VOGUE (Sire Records 1990) [hereinafter MADONNA,
Vogue]; MADONNA, Express Yourself, on LIKE A PRAYER (Sire Records 1989).
97. See, e.g., MADONNA, Papa Don't Preach, on TRUE BLUE (Sire Records 1986); MA-
DONNA, Like A Virgin, on LIKE A VIRGIN (Sire Records 1984).
98. MADONNA, Vogue, supra note 96.
99. Frederic Jameson originated the idea of pastiche in post-modem theory. See Frederic
Jameson, Postmodernism and Consumer Society, in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC: ESSAYS ON
POSTMODERN CULTURE 111, 113 (Hal Foster ed., 1983).
100. Cathy Schwichtenberg, Madonna's Postmodern Feminism, in THE MADONNA CON-
NECTION, supra note 19, at 129, 134.
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tity is the rightful property of one or another sex. It challenges the notion of
an inner truth of sex of which gender identity is merely an external expression.
At the most complex, [drag] is a double inversion that says "appear-
ance is an illusion." Drag says "my 'outside' appearance is feminine,
but my essence 'inside' [the body] is masculine." At the same time it
symbolizes the opposite inversion: "my appearance 'outside' [my
body, my gender] is masculine but my essence 'inside' [myself] is
feminine."''
1
Male drag creates a juridical dissonance when it locates femininity on the male
body and speaks the unspeakable. The drag shticks of comedians like Milton
Berle and Jerry Lewis were funny to many people because they consisted of
men wearing the "wrong" costumes, but they posed no threat to the dominant
culture's understanding of sex and gender.102 As clowns, their comedic exag-
geration showed they did not really mean anything by it. 103
However, Madonna's pastiche means something else altogether. Not
many people think it's funny. A woman in female drag says something quite
different than a man who dons a dress, wig, and nails. A man in female drag
imitates some "other," while a woman in female drag appears to imitate her-
self. When a woman consciously exaggerates and manipulates femininity and
female sexuality, the pastiche changes from seeming humorous to virtually
unintelligible.
One series of photographs in Sex depicts Madonna interacting with ac-
101. ESTHER NEWTON, MOTHER CAMP: FEMALE IMPERSONATORS IN AMERIcA 103
(1972).
102. To some degree, drag has been accepted as an existing form or style of dress, though
it clearly remains outside the cultural center. For instance, it seems to be integrated into con-
temporary women's fashion. A recent issue of Essence borrowed from drag to make a point
about fun fashion:
We sisters know what they mean when they talk about "Gender-Bender" fashion. It's
borrowing your man's hat, but giving it a flirty, one eyed tilt. Or flashing open a
tailored jacket for a glimpse of something sheer underneath. We've come a long way
since the days when we had to play it straight to get a foot inside the executive suite.
Now we can take care of business in clothes with sass as well as class.
Mister Sister, ESSENCE, Nov. 1992, at 82 (introduction to fashion spread of female models in
"men's clothing" with a "feminine flair"). A recent issue of Vanity Fair exploited a similar
melange of bodies, gender, and beauty. The cover portrayed a teddy-clad model, Cindy Craw-
ford, giving a shave to k.d. lang, a female singer, who was dressed in a man's suit and had her
face (her "beard") covered with shaving cream. VANITY FAIR, Aug. 1993.
103. See JUDITH P. BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 126 (1993):
[Julie Andrews in Victor Victoria, Dustin Hoffman in Tootsie, or Jack Lemmon in
Some Like It Hot are] drag as high het entertainment, and though these films are
surely important to read as cultural texts in which homophobia and homosexual panic
are negotiated, I would be reticent to call them subversive. Indeed, one might argue
that such films are functional in providing a ritualistic release for a heterosexual econ-
omy that must constantly police its own boundaries against the invasion of queerness,
and that this displaced production and resolution of homosexual panic actually forti-
fies the heterosexual regime in its self-perpetuating task.
(footnote omitted).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1993-94]
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
tress Isabella Rossellini, who is dressed in a man's suit." 4 These pictures go
beyond a reverse male drag, for the fantasies they represent create erotic havoc
at the three-way intersection of a decontextualized female body, sexual re-
orientation, and a fluid mapping of masculine and feminine identity. In effect,
Madonna is borrowing from lesbian femmes who have said they like their boys
to be girls. When a woman dressed as a man desires another woman dressed
as a woman (or not dressed at all), the object of her desire is different than that
of a man who lusts after a woman. In other words, Madonna's fantasies allow
us to question whether the object of lesbian/butch desire is an entirely differ-
ent female/femme than the object coveted by heterosexual/masculinity.
Madonna both eludes the feminist labe010 and escapes the rhetoric of
feminism. Claiming the label "Boy Toy" early in her career was a strategic
move similar to the one made by film director Marion Riggs, who speaks of
"negro faggotry" in order to evade both the understanding of homosexuality
by gay white males and the understanding of race by proponents of black
power. 106 This practice of self-signification has a quality similar to the struc-
ture of the game show "Jeopardy!". As your host, Madonna is giving you the
answer: sex. It's up to you, the reader, to figure out the question.
Madonna's ability to see humor in anyone or in anything being taken too
seriously is evident throughout Sex. Very early in the book, among a series of
scenes with Madonna and two S/M lesbians, 10 7 appears a photograph of the
three of them laughing, perhaps at themselves or at the idea that anyone
would take too seriously their power play."1 In this photograph, Madonna
seems to express visually what Judith Butler has observed about pastiche:
"[T]here is a subversive laughter in the pastiche-effect of parodic practices in
which the original, the authentic, and the real are themselves constituted as
effects." 10 9
Weaving together photographs, text, and music, Sex and Madonna's
other work110 represent both a conscious construction and constructed con-
sciousness of desire. If consciousness is a strategy, then identity is an attitude,
and gender is a fashion statement. By liberating desire from language, gender
from bodies, and sex from labels, Madonna creates a sexual subject through a
process similar to that described by Linda Alcoff and Teresa de Lauretis. Ac-
cording to Alcoff, de Lauretis argues that "language is not the sole source and
104. MADONNA, supra note 1, at 87-89, 91.
105. Camille Paglia, the feminist that feminists love to hate, wants to claim Madonna as
the ultimate feminist of the 1990s. See, e.g., Camille Paglia, Flashpoint, Us, Dec. 1992, at 18;
Camille Paglia, Madonna-Finally, A Real Feminist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at A39. But
see Ellen Goodman, No Sermon, Madonna, If You Cut the Propaganda, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23,
1986, § 2, at 5 (criticizing Madonna's song, "Papa Don't Preach," for not alerting teenage wo-
men to the perils of early motherhood).
106. Tongues Untied (PBS television broadcast, Jul. 16, 1989).
107. MADONNA, supra note 1, at 7-15.
108. Id. at 11.
109. BUTLER, supra note 22, at 146.
110. See supra notes 96-97.
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locus of meaning, that habits and practices are crucial in the construction of
meaning, and that through self-analyzing practices we can rearticulate female
subjectivity." 111 In Sex, Madonna may be creating just such a subjectivity:
I don't think that you have to have a language in common with
someone to have sexual rapport.... Sex can overcome the language
barrier because it's all body language anyway .... Sometimes when
you can't speak it kind of frees you up. They're whispering all this
shit in your ear and they could be talking about the theory of relativ-
ity for all you know. They could be calling you a cunt bitch whore
from hell. They could be saying, "As soon as you come I'm going to
kill you," and you're yelling, "1Yes! yes!,"
112
Sex does not deliver a unifying or whole description or explanation of
Madonna's sexuality. Rather, like post-structuralist feminists, Madonna
deconstructs the substantive appearances of gender and sex into their constitu-
tive acts. With each turn of the page, we discover a new scene with new ac-
tors, who seem to be saying, "Let's try this. Ooh, that feels good!" As a
reader, I feel almost like the straight men from Wall Street who frequent
Sally's, a well-known transvestite/transsexual hooker bar in Times Square in
New York City, on their way back to the suburbs in the evening. For two
bucks up at the bar you can slip your hand up a girl's skirt and cop a feel. The
excitement, for some, is in the mystery of what they will find at the top of her
thigh. For the regulars, the sexual thrill involves the overlay of illusion, the
destabilized erotic possibilities of a man feeling up either a man dressed as a
woman, a former man dressed as a woman, a man dressed as a lesbian, or a
woman. In this setting, as in Sex, the sexual subject, stripped of reductive
labels, is able to play with unconstrained desire. Sexual identity becomes a
matter of accessories.'
1 3
The message from Sally's and Sex is that desire is not confined by a sys-
tem of mutually exclusive categories and labels, such as heterosexual and ho-
mosexual, male and female. Sexuality is much more complicated. It is, as
Janet Halley writes, a continuum from desire, to particular sexual acts or be-
111. Alcoff, supra note 67, at 431.
112. MADONNA, supra note 1, at 95.
113. The yoking of sexual identity and fashion is certainly not a new idea for gay men and
lesbians, who have always relied heavily upon dress as a code or signal to find one another and
to reflect sexual style:
Although there is persistent folklore about how homosexuals look, act, or behave, the
truth is that one of the problematis-and survival tactics--of homosexuals is to be
able to perform and "unperform" ("signify" and "pass") membership: a cluster of
tactics homosexuals share in common with African Americans, though perhaps in-
verted. A major mode of signifying for modem homosexuals has been to subvert or
hyperperform signifiers of gender. Likewise, strict attention to gender signifiers (espe-
cially those that match one's biological sex signifiers) have constituted a major form of
"passing."
Cindy Patton, Embodying Subaltern Memory: Kinesthesia & the Problematics of Gender &
Race, in THE MADONNA CoNNECrioN, supra note 19, at 87.
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haviors, to internal naming of identity, to external or public labeling.114 This
conception of sexuality allows us to see desire as both separate from and re-
lated to the power inherent in the dominant discourse that makes external
labeling possible. What we desire or fantasize about may thus not "fit" with
our private definitions of our sexuality.
The shotgun precision of the public labeling of sexuality, which tells wo-
men that they are heterosexual and defines what they like to do, suffers from
an epistemological imperialism that denies the possibility of female sexual
agency. Are we to locate our "true" sexuality in our private erotic desires, in
those desires we choose to act upon with our sexual partner(s), in the labels we
give ourselves, or in the labels the external world gives us? If a self-defined
lesbian, subject to the overwhelming cultural power of compulsory heterosex-
uality, fantasizes about and gets turned on by the idea of being fucked by a
man, can we still say anything meaningful about the term lesbian? What is the
difference between the heterosexual woman who closes her eyes and fantasizes
about a woman performing oral sex on her every time her boyfriend goes
down on her and the lesbian who gets off on looking down and seeing a wo-
man between her legs?"'5
What is it, after all, that we are liberating?
This question is what makes Sex and sex especially interesting. In her
book, Madonna strips away category and reveals particular practices and her
own personal desires. If the power of heteromasculinity derives from its abil-
ity to deploy reductive and stable signifiers of masculinity and femininity, Ma-
donna challenges that power by destabilizing the coherence of gender, sexual
orientation, and sex. She does so by playing off of the dominant discourse, by
using pastiche to illustrate that her desire is to "normal" sexuality as a copy is
to a copy, and to show that the idea of a true or real sexuality is a lie:
The big lies. "I love you." Everybody loves you when they are
114. Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Les-
bian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915, 932-63 (1989).
115. Even more interesting, confusing, and challenging to essentialist notions of sexuality
is the increasingly popular phenomenon of on-line computer sex. With a modem and a com-
puter, people can log on to sexual cyberspace in which they can select from a wide menu of
sexual encounters in what are called "public rooms." Once in a room, the participants flirt and
proposition one another until exiting to "private rooms" in pairs or groups to "have sex." This
new medium for sexual encounters provides entirely new possibilities for anonymous sex, fan-
tasy, and manipulation of the sexual subject. Lesbians can and do pass for gay men in the gay
rooms, straight men frequently pass for women in the lesbian rooms, and gay men pass as
straight women in the heterosexual rooms. Not surprisingly, many straight men in the hetero-
sexual rooms and many women in the lesbian rooms are concerned with ferreting out imposters
through strategic questioning and testing. The straight men are afraid of having a homosexual
experience via computer sex with a man passing as a woman, while the lesbians take issue with
straight men trying to invade their women-only space. This hostility to the manipulation of sex
and orientation on the part of some straight men and lesbians is tremendously interesting since
it occurs in a context defined by the power of anonymous sexual fantasy. It attests to both the
potency of homophobia and the degree to which lesbians feel assaulted by straight males' pre-
sumptuous sexuality.
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about to come. Then there's I won't come in you-that's the biggest
lie. Believe that one and you'll buy the Brooklyn Bridge. Then there
are guys who say "I have never fantasized about being with a man."
They are lying. And the least offensive men I've been with in terms
of their sexual politics and how they view me as a woman have been
men who have either slept with men or at least kissed or held a man
once. It opens up your thinking. You don't think that women are
less than you are. And of course there's "This won't hurt a bit."' 16
Both radical essentialist and post-structuralist theorists recognize the lies
that try to pass as truths about gender, sex, and sexuality. They part com-
pany, however, in their prescriptions for what to do with the lies once they are
exposed. The essentialists' political mission is to tell the truth from a single,
epistemological standpoint outside the male hegemony and without the lan-
guage that produces the lies. For the post-structuralists, telling the truth is
impossible without language, and all language creates its own truth. The femi-
nist task is thus to disrupt univocal posturing through the subversion of any
and all language available to us. If language has the power to create what is
socially real, then we must talk and perform our way out of a reality that
maims us and leaves us partial beings. Sex seems to be at least partial proof
that this can work. Madonna declares that Sex is about "fantasies I have
dreamed up"' 117 and then proceeds to act them out, write them down, and sing
them to us. What else could she do?
III
CONCLUSION
In a movement in which some (straight) feminists annually protest the
Sports Illustrated "swimsuit issue," and some (lesbian) feminists rush out to
buy it the day it hits the newsstands, what values can all feminists share when
it comes to liberating women's sexuality?" 8s At the very least, most feminists
would agree that female sexuality is profoundly influenced by male sexuality.
But how do we go about discovering what we truly desire? Radical essential-
ism provides unsatisfactory and incomplete answers to this question. Presum-
ing a transcendent, univocal, and universal female experience, essentialism
neither accounts for its own normative priority, nor legitimately speaks for all
women.
Feminist post-structuralism approaches the authenticity of the female ex-
perience in a different manner. Social theorists like Judith Butler and Joan
116. MADONNA, supra note 1, at 63.
117. Id. at2.
118. I am not prepared to say, however, that women's failure to agree on the genesis of
sexual oppression can be reduced merely to differences in sexual orientation, although I do
believe that lesbians and straight women experience sexism quite differently. Even among lesbi-
ans there is little agreement about matters such as gay marriage, sado-masochistic sex, or the
significance of butch and femme.
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Scott propose a more dispersed constellation of power relationships, which
constructs a multiplicity of meanings and possibilities for women's lives and
which offers the opportunity for female agency:
Within these processes and structures, there is room for a concept of
human agency as the attempt (at least partially rational) to construct
an identity, a life, a set of relationships, a society within certain lim-
its and with language-conceptual language that at once sets bound-
aries and contains the possibility for negation, resistance,
reinterpretation, the play of metaphoric invention and
imagination.119
The play of metaphoric invention and imagination describes what Ma-
donna is up to in Sex. Perhaps we can find the most liberated and exciting
forms of female sexual experience through a kind of hermeneutic vampirism,
whereby we rummage through past and present sexual iconography and suck
what life we can out of the unsuspecting world around us. By feeding our-
selves with the stolen souls of the only sexual forms available to us, we hold in
our hands the power to shape and transform what has shaped and trans-
formed us.
119. ScoTr, supra note 25, at 42.
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